Design and implementation of an anonymous peer-to-peer iaas cloud by Amati, Michele
Alma Mater Studiorum · Università di Bologna
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Sommario (Italian)
In questo lavoro tratterò del problema della privacy e dell'anonimato nel
mondo del Cloud Computing. Un mondo che recentemente ha conosciuto
una considerevole espansione e non riguarda più solo le grandi aziende, ma
anche tutte le persone comuni che abbiano un computer o anche solo uno
smartphone. Forse non ne siamo tutti consapevoli, ma quando inviamo una
e-mail attraverso una Web Mail, quando il nostro smartphone esegue il bac-
kup automatico delle foto sul nostro account (Google, Apple, o Microsoft che
sia), quando usiamo una qualsiasi Web Application, noi stiamo sfruttando
dei servizi Cloud. Servizi dei quali, spesso e volentieri, non sappiamo prati-
camente nulla e ai quali adiamo ciecamente i nostri dati. Possiamo essere
sicuri che il Cloud Service Provider di turno non si prenda troppe libertà?
Che la condenzialità dei nostri dati non venga, in un modo o nell'altro, vio-
lata? Domande avvalorate dalla recente scoperta delle attività di `spionaggio'
su larga scala ad opera della National Security Agency americana [9][10].
L'anonimato è un modo per raggiungere la privacy, e non è chiaramente
un'invenzione recente, è già stato applicato in passato a cose fondamentali
come ad esempio le comunicazioni. Più il Cloud diventa un'esigenza, più
la possibilità di avere un servizio cloud anonimo diventa importante. Ed
eccoci arrivati al punto, in questo lavoro partirò da un software prototipale
per la costruzione di un'infrastruttura cloud peer-to-peer[5], e farò in modo
di renderlo anonimo attraverso l'utilizzo delle reti di anonimizzazione, co-
me ad esempio Tor[14]. Il risultato sarà dunque un prototipo in grado di
creare un'infrastruttura per servizi cloud nella quale non solo gli utenti sa-
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ranno anonimi, ma anche tutte le singole componenti della rete (Peers) non
si conosceranno se non attraverso indirizzi ttizi.
Procederò nel seguente modo: inizialmente mostrerò lo stato dell'arte
per quanto riguarda il Cloud Computing, soermandomi sulle dierenze tra
le architetture più centralizzate adottate dai grandi vendor del settore, e
quella distribuita del prototipo a mia disposizione. Successivamente farò
un confronto tra le reti di anonimizzazione esistenti, approfondendone il più
possibile il funzionamento. A questo riguardo faccio presente che non si tratta
di `strumenti' magici che proteggono la nostra identità sempre e comunque.
Vanno capiti ed usati con giudizio, altrimenti l'unica cosa che si ottiene è un
calo prestazionale, sì, perché a seconda del livello di anonimato desiderato
c'è un prezzo da pagare in termini di risorse e questo porta ad un degrado
più o meno signicativo delle prestazioni.
Le prestazioni saranno appunto un elemento che valuterò dopo aver ap-
portato le necessarie modiche al prototipo, confrontando quelle della versio-
ne originale con quelle della versione anonima. I test che lancerò consisteran-
no nell'esecuzione del prototipo su un certo (grande) numero di macchine,
e nella valutazione dei tempi di esecuzione di alcune operazioni. Per avere
un numero sucientemente alto di macchine mi rivolgerò ai servizi di Ama-
zon EC2[28]. Attraverso uno script automatizzerò la creazione delle istanze
(macchine), l'avvio dei prototipi, la chiamata alle varie API interessate dai
test e tutte le altre operazioni necessarie. I risultati sono esposti al capitolo
4 nella sezione 4.3.
Introduction
Cloud services are becoming ever more important for everyone's life.
Cloud storage? Web mails? Yes, we don't need to be working in big IT
companies to be surrounded by cloud services. Another thing that's growing
in importance, or at least that should be considered ever more important,
is the concept of privacy. The more we rely on services of which we know
close to nothing about, the more we should be worried about our privacy.
In this work, I will analyze a prototype software based on a peer to peer
architecture for the oering of cloud services[5], to see if it's possible to make
it completely anonymous, meaning that not only the users using it will be
anonymous, but also the Peers composing it will not know the real identity
of each others. To make it possible, I will make use of anonymizing networks
like Tor[14].
I will start by studying the state of art of Cloud Computing, by looking
at some real example, followed by analyzing the architecture of the proto-
type, trying to expose the dierences between its distributed nature and the
somehow centralized solutions oered by the famous vendors. After that, I
will get as deep as possible into the working principle of the anonymizing
networks, because they are not something that can just be `applied' mind-
lessly. Some de-anonymizing techniques are very subtle so things must be
studied carefully.
I will then implement the required changes, and test the new anonymized
prototype to see how its performances dier from those of the standard one.
The prototype will be run on many machines, orchestrated by a tester script
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that will automatically start, stop and do all the required API calls. As to
where to nd all these machines, I will make use of Amazon EC2[28] cloud
services and their on-demand instances.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to cloud computing
and anonymizing networks
In this rst chapter I'll introduce the basic concepts of Cloud Computing
and of Anonymizing Networks. Both topics are quite wide and complex so
I'll focus mainly on the aspects relevant to my work.
1.1 Cloud computing
As dened by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
the Cloud is: A model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand net-
work access to a shared pool of congurable computing resources (e.g., net-
works, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly pro-
visioned and released with minimal management eort or service provider
interaction. [1]
There are many types of Cloud services but they all share the same main
idea that somewhere, somehow, there are computer-related resources that a
user can use through a public interface to carry out his tasks. He can use
them wherever he wants and whenever he wants paying only for what he
uses. Extreme scalability makes it easy to follow the business needs allowing
to get more resources almost instantly and release them as fast as they were
1
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got when they are not needed anymore, without having to deal with lot of
expensive hardware laying unused and getting old. With this in mind it's
easy to understand why the Cloud business has spread so much and it's still
expanding. The ever improving quality and diusion of Internet connections
also played a big part in making this possible since Cloud without Internet
is as impossible as real clouds without the sky.
So is Cloud the best solution for everyone? No, the Cloud has require-
ments and downsides too. The main requirement is that the user has to be
able to reach it in a fast and reliable way, which means, he needs an ap-
propriated Internet connection. Most of the other downsides derive by the
fact that the user looses some of the control he has over his process making
use of the Cloud. He can only trust the Cloud Service Provider will do as
written in the Terms of Service (ToS). Most of the times he knows nothing
about how the Cloud System really works behind the public interface, or
even where that system and the user data are located. The more security is
important for the user, the more this aspect of the Cloud gets problematic
because there can't be security as long as one or more parts of the system
are unknown. This issue is partially solved in Private and Hybrid Clouds
described in this document at 1.1.2.
1.1.1 Types of service
Cloud services can be divided into three categories, ordered ascending by
the level of abstraction from the physical resources:
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The user gets remote access to the
fundamental computing resources, e.g. processing, storage, network...
This is the level that leaves the user the most freedom at the cost of an
increased diculty in handling the whole thing because it's up to him
to install, congure and maintain software (and that may include the
Operative System).
Platform as a Service (PaaS). The user gets a platform, which is a soft-
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ware that hides the lower infrastructure level and makes it easier for
the user to build his own service like e.g. allowing software packages
to be installed and congured in a graphical drag and drop way. The
user has less freedom than in the IaaS model, but he hasn't to worry
about updates, congurations and software compatibility.
Software as a Service (SaaS). The user gets the possibility to use a soft-
ware remotely. He doesn't know what components form it, nor he
knows anything about the lower infrastructure level on which it runs.
There are many commonly used SaaS services we use every day, e.g. all
the cloud storage services, all the web apps used for streaming music
or for managing emails.
1.1.2 Deployment models
Cloud services can also be classied according to the users that can access
them. They can be:
Public. Anyone who can pay for them can use them. It's the most widespread
version.
Private. Usually built by big organizations, they can only be used by a
restricted group of authorized user (that are often members of the or-
ganization that build them).
Community. Similar to the Private one but used by a community made of
organizations that share the same concerns.
Hybrid. A mix of the three above, e.g. part of the Cloud could be Private
and can be used to store/process sensitive data, while the rest could
be Public.
There are many reasons why Clouds that are at least partially Private
are a lot better at security:
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• As I have already mentioned, having one or more parts of the system
that we don't know how they are built or how they work, makes us
unable to design an appropriate security system. This unknown factor
is lower or zero in Private Clouds. It depends of who own, manage and
operate the Cloud. A Private Cloud is not necessarily owned, managed
and operated by the organization itself, if a third part does it, there
might still be an unknown factor.
• The isolation level is maximum. Isolation level is a `measure' of how
good the shared resources are kept separated among the multiple users
of the Cloud. In a Public Cloud our data might be stored on the same
physical machine where the software of a malicious user is running,
trying to break the virtual isolation to reach others data.
• The chance of getting malicious insiders is much lower since the access
to the cloud is restricted.
1.1.3 Classic cloud vs P2P cloud
The architecture of a Cloud System can be designed in many dierent
ways. Vendors often refuse to show how their systems are designed but we
can look at one of the many Open Source projects to get an idea. An example
is OpenStack.
OpenStack is a cloud operating system that controls large pools of com-
pute, storage, and networking resources throughout a datacenter, all man-
aged through a dashboard [...] [2]. In the OpenStack architecture we can
nd the following components:
Horizon. Is the dashboard through which users can administrate the system
by doing API-Calls.
Heat. Is a template-based orchestrator. Templates are les that describe
specic cloud applications (resources and congurations).
1.1 Cloud computing 5
Nova. The computing module.
Glance. Provides and manages disk images.
Swift. An unstructured data storage system.
Neutron. Manages networking and network interface devices.
Cinder. Manages persistent storage.
Keystone. Manages identities and permissions.
Figure 1.1: OpenStack Components Diagram [3]
In gure 1.1 we can also see the concept of Region, which is a way to
point out the physical location of parts of the system. It can be useful if we
want to be sure some sensitive data do not leave the country, or to implement
fault tolerance.
OpenStack makes large use of virtualization, Nova works with virtual
CPUs (VCPUs), Neutron uses virtual network interfaces, Cinder works with
virtual disk volumes. Virtualization is essential for the `rapid provision' prop-
erty of the cloud.
To be able to use more than a physical machine, to create a cluster on
which OpenStack runs, one or more nodes have to become Cloud Controller.
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In the OpenStack documentation is written that: The cloud controller pro-
vides the central management system for OpenStack deployments. Typically,
the cloud controller manages authentication and sends messages to all the
systems through a message queue. [4] In other words, Cloud Controllers
provide the required coordination.
Getting deep on how OpenStack (or other similar Cloud System) works
is out of the scope of this work. I mentioned it just to be able to show the
dierences between a `classical' architecture and a P2P architecture. The im-
portant points to keep in mind are: modularity, virtualization and hierarchy
between the machines forming the system.
The concept of Peer to Peer (P2P) was born before the Cloud. P2P
denotes those architectures where the software entities that take part to
the system are somehow connected (e.g. Internet) and are `peer', with no
centralized control and/or hierarchy. How exactly this entities communicate
and how can they work together to produce some kind of result is up to
the specic application. P2P architectures usually oer great scalability, can
make use of many low-power heterogeneous machines and are often great
at fault tolerance but are also harder to design due to the dierent way
coordination must be achieved. Recently some work has being done to design
a Cloud system that uses a P2P architecture, from now on I'll take as an
example of such work the thesis Progettazione e Sviluppo di un Sistema Cloud
P2P (Design and Implementation of a P2P Cloud System) [5] [6] by Michele
Tamburini.
We will call Node or Peer an instance of the P2P Cloud System software
running on a machine. There can be more than one node on a single physical
machine but it would not make much sense in a real scenario. The nodes
are connected by an overlay network1 upon a standard routed network like
the Internet. Coordination among nodes is achieved in a completely decen-
tralized way, by decisions taken locally in each node with the local available
1Overlay Network: a network build on top of another network where links between
nodes can be logical or virtual and correspond to paths on the `real' underling network.
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information. The users can request the cloud's resources through a public in-
terface that aims to be as close as possible to the one oered by the `standard'
cloud systems.
Figure 1.2: P2P Cloud System Architecture as designed by Michele Tamburini [7]. The
white components are those that have not been implemented in the prototype attached to
his thesis.
Let's take a closer look at his architecture, from the bottom to the top
(Figure: 1.2) we have:
Peer Sampling Service (PSS). Since the number of nodes forming the
cloud could be very high, it's not possible for each node to keep a
list of the addresses of all the other nodes. This is where the PSS
come in use. Every node keeps a partial view, a small list with the
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addresses of few other nodes. The PSS uses a gossip algorithm to
periodically exchange information regarding the partial view with other
nodes (contained in the partial view), and uses them to update the
content of the local partial view itself. This way every partial view
will behave like a random subset of all the nodes in the network. Given
that the time between taking samples is high enough, picking a random
node from the partial view will be like picking a random node from all
the nodes in the network.
Slicing Service. It allows to get a slice (a subset) of nodes that match some
kind of query, like e.g. those that are best at computing.
Aggregation Service. Using the PSS and a gossip algorithm, it allows each
node to get global knowledge by exchanging local information with
other nodes, e.g. if every node is assigned a number, it's possible for
each node to compute the average of the values of all nodes in the net-
work just by exchanging information with other nodes and changing
their own value to the average of it and the value of the other node.
Again, getting deep on how it works is not the purpose of this docu-
ment, see Gossip-Based Aggregation in Large Dynamic Networks [8] for
a more detailed description of this issue.
Bootstraping Service. It's used to get sub-clouds by creating overlay net-
works (dierent from those created by the PSS). It uses the T-Man
gossip algorithm.
System Modules. The Monitoring System is a resource monitor, it knows
how many free and busy resources we have. The Storage System takes
care of the storage. The Dispatcher System is of some interest to us
because among other tasks it handles and dispatches communications,
something we will have to look at in deep when we'll talk about how
to anonymize the system.
Interface Modules. It includes all the APIs that the user will be able to
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call to use the system.
1.2 Anonymizing networks
In this section, I'll talk about anonymity in the Internet world. What
identify an entity on the Internet? What does it mean to be anonymous?
Why should we want it, we have nothing to hide isn't it? We'll see Anonymiz-
ing Networks as tools that could help us reach a certain degree of anonymity
and we'll use them later to make the P2P Cloud System anonymous.
1.2.1 Introduction to online identity and the impor-
tance of anonymity
Everything that's connected to the Internet can be uniquely identied
by its IP address2, it's like the Italian Codice Fiscale, or the USA Social
Security Number, it's something we have just for being part of the system
and it's actively required to communicate so we can't just throw it away.
But that's not all, even if we nd a way to hide it, our identity can still be
inferred by what we do! Just think at this, you have succeeded in crafting
a fake identity and the one you are talking to do not know who you really
are, but then you inadvertently tell him something real about you and he
starts to be suspicious because it does not t well in your fake identity. He
will start to pay much more attention and everything you do or even how
you look will help him not only understanding that you're not who you said
you are, but it might even be able to narrow it down until he nds your real
identity.
So, we have to solve both problems, nd a way to communicate without
2Actually, thanks to the Network Address Translation (NAT), it is possible for two or
more devices to have the same `private' IP and still be able to communicate through the
Internet. NAT maps each packet that passes through it (directed to the Internet) to a
new packet with a dierent IP (and port numbers) using as the new IP a public unique
one. Responses are also mapped back to the `private' IP.
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using our real identity, and behave in a way that will not give out any infor-
mation that could betray us. In a system that tolerates anonymity it's not a
problem if the other nds out that you are trying to hide, but there are also
systems that would just `kick you out'.
But why should we want anonymity? We are not spies or terrorists, so
why should we care? There could be many reasons:
Privacy. It's not the same thing as anonymity but they are strictly related
concepts. Having privacy means being able to do something without
anyone knowing it. Being anonymous means being able to do something
others will notice but will not be able to connect to you. From the user's
(real identity) point of view anonymity imply privacy. The Nothing
to hide argument is so frequently used when talking about privacy
and anonymity that it even has a dedicated Wikipedia page [12]. We
might tend to agree with that but think at this example by Adam D.
Moore: Imagine upon exiting your house one day you nd a person
searching through your trash painstakingly putting the shredded notes
and documents back together. In response to your stunned silence he
proclaims "you don't have anything to worry about - there is no reason
to hide is there?" [13]. I'm sure most would dislike such thing, and
that's what happens every day with everyone's online activities.
Freedom of speech. Here in Italy, the freedom of speech is (most of the
time) granted, but think at all the totalitarian regimes around the world
where people risk their life if they say the `wrong thing'.
Anonymous complaints. There could be situations in which we feel we
should report or denounce something but we do not want to be involved.
Hide physical location. Given an IP address it's possible to know where
the machine that's using it is physically located. This allows an attacker
to physically harm that system by e.g. cutting the cables that bring
it power or the Internet connection, or even to totally destroy it. In a
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military scenario this is totally possible. Hiding the real IP will prevent
all of this.
Ensure a safe future. This is something most people forget to think of,
actions that are perfectly legit and safe now are not granted to stay
the same in the future! Are you totally sure that the opinion you are
expressing now will not cause you problems, after some years, with the
new `Big Boss' whose opinion will be exactly the opposite of yours?
Any kind of bad things. Anonymity is a feature, it can be used for both
good and bad purposes.
Recently it has emerged that the American's National Security Agency
(NSA) has being spying on every citizen of the world in such a deep way
that no one would have believed it to be possible [9]. They said it is for
protecting themselves from terrorists, and that could be true, but is it all?
And even if it is, is it right that everyone has to pay with his privacy for
it to be possible? How do we know they are not spying on other countries
stealing their industrial secrets? What if they `data-mined' our private data
and knew what we think and what we do and this way they were able to
`manipulate' us? That would be quite easy, it's the daily bread of those who
do marketing. In a single question: Who watches the watchers? No one, or
maybe similar agencies of other countries, but that's of no help to us.
Back to the main topic of this work, communications can already be
anonymized, Internet browsing can already be anonymized but to be able
to do anonymous computation, something like an anonymous cloud system
is needed and P2P architectures are the best starting point because of their
properties (no centralized control, all nodes are peers).
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1.2.2 Basic principle behind anonymizing networks
For a connection3 between two entities on the Internet to be possible,
one must know the address of the other, and once the connection starts, the
second one learns the address of the rst one. A basic way to avoid revealing
an entity's real identity is to use a relay. Consider three entities on the
Internet called A, B, and C. If A wants to talk to B without revealing its
identity it can connect to C and tell C to connect to B. C will act as a relay
for the communication between A and B, so that B will think to be talking
with C instead of A. This solves part of the problem, but still A needs to
know B. Let's add a fourth node D. To protect itself but still be able to oer
its service, B can create a fake identity, an alias that we will call `ServiceB'
and write it somewhere in a public area, something like: To get ServiceB
you have to ask to node D. This way, D will act as a relay exactly like C
did. This is a very basic and weak anonymizing strategy, what if C or D were
corrupted4? Real anonymizing networks are a lot more complex.
An interesting concept strictly related to how anonymizing networks works
is that Anonymity Loves Company [11]. One may think that reaching
anonymity means being as far as possible from anyone who can see or hear
you but that's wrong! It's easy to spot someone who's isolated, much harder
is to nd someone dressed as normal as possible in a place full of people.
With the way anonymizing networks work, it's possible to tell if a service
is being accessed by someone (UserA) who's using an anonymizing network,
and it's also possible to tell if someone else (UserB) is using them, but what
makes them safe (or not) is the number of the anonymizing network users.
The more they are, the harder it will be to tell if UserA and UserB are the
same person.
3Here by `connection' I mean a bidirectional communication. The majority of the
connections over the Internet are bidirectional but there are also unidirectional connections
that would not require the receiver to know the sender. Broadcast communications are
also possible and they would not even require the sender to know the receivers.
4Corruption: The target looses its integrity because of unauthorized modications that
make it function in an unintended manner.
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1.2.3 A comparison of existing anonymizing networks
At the time of writing, there are only two anonymizing networks famous
enough to be worth looking at: The Onion Router (Tor) [14] and the Invisible
Internet Project (I2P) [15]. They share many similarities but there are also
some fundamental dierences. I'll start with the things they have in common.
Unfortunately they use dierent terminology to refer to the same concepts
so it's useful to take a look at the comparison Table 1.1 kindly provided by
the guys of I2P.
Tor I2P
Cell Message
Client Router or Client
Circuit Tunnel
Directory NetDB
Directory Server Floodll Router
Entry Guards Fast Peers
Entry Node Inproxy
Exit Node Outproxy
Hidden Service Eepsite or Destination
Hidden Service Descriptor LeaseSet
Introduction Point Inbound Gateway
Node Router
Onion Proxy I2P Tunnel Client *
Relay Router
Rendezvous Point Inbound Gateway + Outbound Endpoint *
Router Descriptor RouterInfo
Server Router
Table 1.1: Comparison of Tor and I2P Terminology [16]. Items marked with `*' are not
an exact match but more of a similar concept.
Both projects start from the idea presented at 1.2.2 of avoiding direct
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communications, by building a path of nodes through which making them
pass. How they choose the nodes is the rst notable dierence between the
two.
In Tor, a client (Onion Proxy - OP) that needs to build a path (Circuit)
asks few special nodes (Directory Servers) for information about the nodes
(Onion Router - OR) in the network, and then it chooses the ones whose
declared performances better suit its needs. Directory Servers are a small
group of well known servers5 that collect signed state information from all
the OR in the network and use them to create a sort of global view of the
network (Directory) which OPs can fetch.
In I2P, the client (I2P Tunnel Client) asks special routers (Floodll Router)
that have access to a distributed network database (NetDb) which contains
information equivalent to those of the Tor's Directory, information about the
nodes (Router). The big dierence is that any node that matches some basic
performance criteria can and will automatically become a Floodll Router
making things a lot more distributed and decentralized than Tor's Directory
Servers. Floodll Routers collect signed state information from the routers in
the network the same way Directory Servers do with the ORs. Once the path
is created data can be sent. They both make use of encryption to protect
data condentiality and here we have another dierence.
Tor uses a technique called Onion Routing to pack, encrypt and send
data. The name is taken from the onion (vegetable) because of its layered
structure. Every time a message (Cell) has to be sent, the OP encrypts it
a number of times equal to the number of nodes it will cross, using a set
of symmetrical keys created during the circuit creation. Each key is shared
with one of the nodes in the path. It does it in reverse order so that the
outer layer of encryption is the one encrypted with the key of the rst node,
the second outer layer uses the key of the second node and so on. Every time
5About trusting Directory Servers: [...] directory servers must be synchronized and
redundant, so that they can agree on a common directory. Clients should only trust this
directory if it is signed by a threshold of the directory servers. [...] Tor only needs a
threshold consensus of the current state of the network. [17]
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the Cell passes through a node, a level of encryption is removed exposing the
information needed to know what's the next hop. The last node removes the
last level and exposes the unencrypted data. This way every node can only
know information regarding the previous and the next hop and even if they
are compromised they can't do much6.
I2P uses Garlic Routing. It can be seen as an evolution of Onion Routing.
The concept of layered encryption is almost the same, what changes is that
the packet that is sent through the tunnel is not made of a single message
like in Tor's Cells but it's a bundle of messages (Cloves) instead. All mes-
sages have to reach the end of the tunnel so there's no reason to keep them
separated, this also makes it harder to carry out trac analysis attacks7.
Given that paths creation is hard and time consuming due to the latency
and the multiple use of public key encryption8, both Tor and I2P create them
as soon as they can, before they are actually needed and in a transparent
way to the user. Paths are valid for a certain amount of time then they
expire and must be replaced. The same happens if they just break due to
one or more failing nodes, or if the user wants to change them even if they
are still valid and working. Many dierent connections can use the same
path. Another big design dierence is that Tor's Circuits are bidirectional
so one circuit is enough to carry out a communication while I2P's tunnels
are unidirectional so it needs at least an Inbound Tunnel and an Outbound
Tunnel to communicate. This has many implications regarding security and
performance but things gets really complicated and not very useful for my
work so I'm not going to explain them here.
Another thing that's worth focusing on is how Tor and I2P handle the
creations of anonymous services. At 1.2.2, I talked about the fact that, having
two entities A and B, for A to be possible to connect to B, A must know
6Unless almost every node is compromised or the attacker controls both the entry and
exit node.
7Attacks based on trying to infer information by looking at the data (patterns, timings)
even if it's encrypted and unreadable.
8Used to create the set of shared symmetrical keys.
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B. We will now see how B can use Tor or I2P to oer its services without
exposing itself.
Tor calls them Hidden Services, anyone participating in the Tor network
can create his own hidden services. If `B' wants to host one it will do as
follows:
1. B generates a public key pair that will identify his service.
2. B chooses some nodes in the network that will work as Introduction
Points to its service, then it creates circuits to them. After that it cre-
ates a Descriptor containing information about the introduction points
and its public key, and signs it with its private key. Descriptors are as-
sociated a string name in the form XYZ.onion where XYZ is a 16
character name derived from the public key.
3. B uploads this descriptor to the Hidden Service Directory Servers (HS-
Dirs).
Now the service is advertised, to reach it `A' needs to know the .onion
address and will do as follows:
1. A downloads B's descriptor from the HSDirs.
2. A chooses a node in the network that will serve as a Rendezvous Point
(RP) and builds a circuit to it9.
3. A connects to one of B's introduction points and instructs it to tell B
to meet A at the RP.
4. If B wants to talk to A, it will build a circuit to the RP.
5. A and B can now communicate through the RP.
9Actually, the RP is also provided with a rendezvous cookie by A, to be able to recognize
B later. The same cookie is passed to B through one of its introduction points.
1.2 Anonymizing networks 17
In I2P we have something similar but without the Rendezvous Point and
the centralized (redundant) HSDirs. When the service takes the form of a web
server it is called EEPsite but it's also possible to host other types of services.
Things are a bit easier to understand compared to Tor because of the concept
of the Inbound Tunnels. What Tor does by choosing introduction points and
creating circuits to them, in I2P is done be creating one or more Inbound
Tunnels. The node of the tunnel that's further away from where the service
is hosted (Inbound Gateway) is like a Tor's introduction point. To advertise
a service, the hosting node publishes a LeaseSet (like Tor's descriptors) in the
NetDb through a Floodll Router. Every LeaseSet is identied by an address
made of 516 Base6410 characters that can also be expressed in Base32 in the
form {52 chars}.b32.i2p. Anyone in the I2P network that wants to access
the EEPsite have to know the address and use it to get the LeaseSet from
the NetDb. It can then simply connect to one of the Inbound Tunnels listed
in the LeaseSet through one of his Outbound Tunnels.
There are two big dierences between Tor and I2P yet to be discussed.
The rst one regards what types of trac can actually pass through them.
Tor has been designed to work with Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
streams and can't in any way carry User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets.
UDP support has been theorized and would require some deep design change
but the bigger problem is that it would be possible to tell if someone is using
UDP and this would make UDP users easy to deanonymize because soon
after the change, UDP users will be very few compared to the TCP users.
I2P does not suer from this problem and can carry both UDP and TCP.
The last dierence I'll describe is about the communications between some-
one who's inside the anonymizing network and another one who's outside, in
the `normal' Internet. In Tor, ORs can be congured to relay communica-
tions only with other nodes inside the network or also with anyone outside.
Those who can relay communications with the outside Internet are called
10It is a binary-to-text encoding scheme. Binary data is divided into groups of six bits
and than encoded using the Base64 index table [18].
18 1. Introduction to cloud computing and anonymizing networks
Exit Nodes, it's up to every OR to decide if they want to be exit nodes or
not11. In I2P, exit nodes (OutProxies) are special nodes running a dierent
application, hosted by volunteers, and there are very very few of those. A
standard I2P node only relay communications inside the I2P network. This
makes communicating with the outside Internet very slow and unreliable,
I2P's goal are intra-communications.
Back to the main purpose of this document, If I had to choose one for
building the Anonymous P2P Cloud System I would choose Tor. It has a
much larger pool of users and it has been studied a lot more than I2P so
we can assume it's more secure. But the good news is, I don't really have
to choose!12 Given that they both need connections to be `routed' to a
local proxy (luckily the same type of proxy) and that they both use string
addresses that are handled entirely by the proxy, I can design the system to
be independent from the specic anonymizing network. In Chapter 2, I'll
give a better idea of how the system is designed.
11Being an exit node can be very dangerous because its real IP is what the outside
Internet sees so if a Tor user does something bad the exit node is the one who'll be
blamed.
12Unfortunately, during the implementation phase I've encountered a limitation in I2P
support for SOCKS that made it impossible for the prototype to work with it without
some important modication, so I'll just go on with Tor.
Chapter 2
Architecture of a P2P anonymous
cloud system
Now that I have introduced the two fundamental components (anonymiz-
ing networks and P2P cloud architecture), we can start to see how they can
be brought together to create a P2P cloud architecture in which the peers
do not know the real identity of each other.
2.1 Recap of the P2P cloud system architec-
ture
In order to facilitate the comprehension of the anonymizing process, I will
now get back to Figure 1.2 and propose a dierent version of it, this time
built around the Communication Handler 1 component. For now, I will just
ignore the parts that were not implemented in the prototype.
Every module of the node that is interested in receiving messages, creates
a personal Network Manager and registers it to the Message Dispatcher of
the Communication Handler.
1In Figure 1.2 it's not shown but it's the core component that handles communications,
almost every other component uses it.
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Figure 2.1: P2P Cloud System Architecture scheme focused on the communications.
As we can see in Figure 2.1, applications and users interact with the sys-
tem through a set of APIs. The APIs send messages to the Communication
Handler of a node that will function as an entry point for the cloud system.
This node is not special, it's not important what node is chosen to be the
entry point. Once the API message reaches the Communication Handler, it
searches through the registered Network Managers and forwards the message
to the appropriated one. In case of API messages, the appropriate module
is the Dispatcher System.
In Figure 2.2 we can see a simple API call that has no consequences on
the node, and just returns some information. It's also possible for API calls
to alter the structure of the node they are sent to, by adding or removing
modules (also called services). A good example of such behavior is the API
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Figure 2.2: Example of the simplest API call possible. Communication Handler (CH),
Dispatch System (DS), Peer Sampling Service (PSS), Aggregation Service (AGG).
RunNodes, that tries to create a sub-cloud with a certain topology2 using the
Bootstraping Service that it adds to the node.
API calls are communications between the nodes and something that is
outside of the cloud. There are also a lot of communications between nodes
of the cloud. In Figure 2.3 we can see the communication between two PSS
modules of dierent nodes.
Intra-cloud communications represent the majority of the communica-
tions. They are mostly generated by the gossip algorithms that power the
basic cloud services. By design, gossip algorithms need to frequently ex-
2The arrangement of the nodes in the sub-cloud. Depending on the way they are
connected, they can form various topologies e.g. Star, Ring, Mash, Tree... [19]
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Figure 2.3: Communication ow between two PSS.
change (or at least push or pull) information. How frequently is not xed,
a reasonable range can go from less than a second to half a minute, it re-
ally depends on the specic algorithm and the desired performances, not to
mention the performances of the means of communication (like the Internet
connection speed and latency).
Every communication between two nodes follows the same pattern: local
module > local Communication Handler > remote Communication Han-
dler > remote module. Replies, if needed, can use the same connection (the
one initialized by the remote node) or can also take the form of a second com-
munication, similar to the rst one but in the reverse order. If it was not yet
clear, the Communication Handler is the core point of every communication
and that's why I'll focus on it to anonymize the system.
2.2 Towards anonymization (what needs to be
changed)
So, once again, to anonymize the system we will have to look at every
connection and make sure they are redirected to pass through the anonymiz-
ing network. We will also have to check that the data sent through those
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connections do not reveal anything that could help an attacker in the de-
anonymization process.
2.2.1 Obvious problems (direct connections)
That's the easy part. Normally, this task would require to nd every
point in every module where a communication is needed and change it to use
the anonymizing network. But wait, we have the Communication Handler
where every connection leaves and enters the node so we only need to make
one `big' change there and we are done3!
For such a modication to be possible, we also need to make a little change
at how the nodes identify themselves. Prior to this change, every node was
identied by a Name and an Address. The Name is not that important, it is
used to distinguish the nodes if there are two or more on the same machine
(and for other minor things). The Address is the public real identity of the
node, it can be directly an IP address or a domain name, and we can no
longer use it if we want to make the system anonymous. From now on, every
node is identied by a Name (unchanged) and a Fake Address.
One last thing. The communications originated by the APIs, used by
the applications and the users, do not pass through a `local' Communication
Handler. So we have to reproduce the same changes we made to the Com-
munication Handler to them, in order to make them use the anonymizing
network.
2.2.2 Hidden problems (leaks)
Much harder to spot are the possible information leaks. They can be
everywhere and do not necessarily be limited to a single communication. A
communication can leak just a little useless piece of information, but lots of
pieces can be brought together to get an ever increasing chance of successful
3Atually, we still need to look at every point in every module where connections are
initialized to nd possible leaks. See 2.2.2.
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guessing. Information can also be obtained by combining the pieces of com-
munication of dierent modules. Timing and communications order can also
lead to leaks.
Before starting to look for leaks it is useful to dene exactly what is
our threat model and who could be the attacker. We are trying to design
an architecture for anonymous computation, our main asset (that we must
defend) is the anonymity of the nodes and of the users. The threats we are
interested in are those caused by the possible aws in the design, that if
exploited would result in the de-anonymization of one or more entities of our
system. We don't care if a node willingly gives out information. What we
care is if there's something in the design that someone could use to obtain
information that are not supposed to be exposed. Here I will also assume
that the implementation will be perfect and bug free.
The attacker could be someone outside the cloud (user), or someone inside
the cloud (malicious node). Given that there will be no centralization and
peers will be anonymous, it will be very hard to detect and remove a malicious
node so the chances of that happening is much higher than in other more
standard clouds. I'm now going to list and analyze all the communications
of the basic modules of the system and of the APIs, results are summed up
in Table 2.1. While the basic modules (PSS, BS, AGG) could be analyzed
in a purely theoretical way, the APIs are more implementation dependent
so I'll use those that are implemented in the prototype. A brief description
of the APIs (scripts and algorithms) will follow, but I suggest to see [5] for
more details.
All the APIs have a script part and an algorithm part. The script part
is the one executed outside the cloud and contains the instructions to start
a communication with a node. The algorithm part is what's executed inside
the node (thus inside the cloud) after it receives the corresponding script
communication. Scripts names are lower case words separated by under-
scores, algorithms names contain the same words of the corresponding script
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but they use CamelCase4 style.
Module Detail Action Loop Leaks
API (script) run_nodes send / receive NO minor
API (script) terminate_nodes send / receive NO minor
API (script) add_new_nodes send / receive NO minor
API (script) describe_instances send / receive NO NO
API (script) monitor_instances send NO NO
API (script) unmonitor_instances send NO NO
API (algorithm) RunNodes send NO minor
API (algorithm) TerminateNodes send NO NO
API (algorithm) AddNewNodes send NO minor
API (algorithm) DescribeInstances send NO NO
API (algorithm) MonitorInstances send NO NO
API (algorithm) UnmonitorInstances send NO NO
PSS gossip-active send / receive YES medium
PSS gossip-passive send / receive YES medium
BS gossip-active send / receive YES minor
BS gossip-passive send / receive YES minor
AGG gossip-active send / receive YES NO
AGG gossip-passive send / receive YES NO
SS gossip-passive send / receive YES medium
SS gossip-passive send / receive YES medium
Table 2.1: A list of all the communications of the system, with their type and threat
level.
run_nodes. It connects to a node and asks it to create a sub-cloud with a
certain name and a certain size. Then it waits for one response from
the node that served as an entry point to the cloud, and for a number
4It consists of writing compound words such that each next word or abbreviation begins
with a capital letter [20].
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of other responses equal to size from the nodes that have formed the
sub-cloud. The only information an attacker could get from this is
the number of free nodes5, because the system will return an error if
there are not enough nodes to create the sub-cloud. An attacker could
just keep trying bigger sizes until he gets the error. This assuming the
system does not limit the number of nodes anyone can get.
RunNodes. Executed on a node, it uses the local PSS to get the required
number of (free) nodes and then it tells them to join the sub-cloud by
starting their BS modules. The only interesting information I can think
of here, comes from the ability to check if a node is free or it's already
part of a sub-cloud.
terminate_nodes. It connects to a node participating in a sub-cloud and
asks it to remove one or more nodes from that sub-cloud. The leak-level
of this, depends mostly on the verbosity of the errors. If the system
returns an error in case the contacted node is not in a sub-cloud or/and
if one or more nodes to remove are not there, the attacker could nd
out if a node is in use and what other nodes it is linked to.
TerminateNodes. It sends a message to the nodes to be removed, basically
telling them that they have been removed, and also it sends messages
to the remaining nodes telling them to update their views after the
other nodes removal. I don't think there's anything that could leak
here.
add_new_nodes. Almost like run_nodes, but instead of creating a new
sub-cloud it adds nodes to an existing one. Same leaks implications.
AddNewNodes. Almost like RunNodes, but instead of creating a new sub-
cloud it adds nodes to an existing one. Same leaks implications.
5Nodes that are not participating in any sub-cloud.
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describe_instances. It connects to a node and asks it its sub-cloud id and
its neighbors. An error is returned if the node is not part of a sub-cloud.
Well, this one doesn't need to be exploited to give out information.
DescribeInstances. It just gathers the required local information and sends
them to whom who asked for them.
monitor_instances. It connects to a node and asks it to start its `monitor-
ing system' that uses the AGG to estimate the total number of nodes
in the cloud. No leaks here as far as I know.
MonitorInstances. Starts polling the AGG module to estimate the total
number of nodes in the cloud. No undesired leaks here.
unmonitor_instances. Opposite of monitor_instances.
UnmonitorInstances. Opposite of MonitorInstances.
In no way I consider this analysis complete. This APIs are too `rough',
too much dierent from those of a real usable cloud system so it's not worth
spending time on them since even a small change will lead to completely
dierent leak situation. On the contrary, the basic modules are quite `stable':
PSS
In Algorithm 1 we can see the algorithm used by the PSS. For a detailed
explanation see [21], but to us the only important things to know are the
following. There are two threads6, an active one that starts the communi-
cations and a passive one that waits for them. In every PSS module there
are both the active and the passive threads. Every loop, the active thread
chooses a peer to communicate with from the local partial view, and sends
it a subset of its view. This subset is made of random peers chosen among
all but the H oldest peers. In the most frequently used conguration (push
+ pull), the active thread also awaits for the receiver to send it its subset,
6Independent logical control ow.
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obtained in the same way. Then they both merge their view with the ob-
tained subset (method select), following certain rules to remove duplicates
and older nodes, and also giving priority to the peers contained in the subset
(parameter S of the algorithm controls the priority).
Algorithm 1 The Peer Sampling Service Algorithm [21].
(a) Active Thread
1: loop
2: wait(T time units)
3: p ← view.selectPeer()
4: if push then
5: // 0 is the initial age
6: buer ← ((MyAddress,0))
7: view.permute()
8: move oldest H items to the end of view
9: buer.append(view.head(c/2-1))
10: send buer to p
11: else
12: // empty view to trigger response
13: send (null) to p
14: end if
15: if pull then
16: receive buerp from p
17: view.select(c,H,S,buerp)
18: end if
19: view.increaseAge()
20: end loop
(b) Passive Thread
1: loop
2: receive buerp from p
3: if pull then
4: // 0 is the initial age
5: buer ← ((MyAddress,0))
6: view.permute()
7: move oldest H items to the end of view
8: buer.append(view.head(c/2-1))
9: send buer to p
10: end if
11: view.select(c,H,S,buerp)
12: view.increaseAge()
13: end loop
I can see a leak threat here. A node that has just exchanged its peers
information with another node, knows some of the peers that the other node
is likely to be still `using'. This piece of information alone is not that useful
but it could be used together with something else, like e.g. asking that node
to create a sub-cloud soon after the exchange will probably lead to the sub-
cloud having at least one of the known peers. Luckily, this works only for a
very limited time after the exchange.
BS
In Algorithm 2 we can see the T-Man algorithm used by the BS module.
For the detailed explanation see [22]. As with the PSS there are an active
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and a passive thread, and both are needed in every node. Given a set of
nodes (in our case, the nodes of a sub-cloud), every node will run the BS
module and will keep a partial view7 containing a sub-set of the nodes of the
sub-cloud. Continuous exchanging, and sorting of the nodes of the partial
views with a certain rank function, leads to the creation of a specic network
topology dependent of the function. The active thread selects a peer among
the peers of its view that it prefers the most (according to the rank function),
and sends it the rst m peers of its view sorted by the same function to be
those that it will prefers the most. Then it waits for the receiver node to do
the same and `reply' with its m entries. Finally they both merge their views
with the received list of peers.
Algorithm 2 The T-Man Algorithm [22].
(a) Active Thread
1: loop
2: wait(T time units)
3: // select rand. among rst N ranked descriptors
4: p ← view.selectPeer(N,rank(myDescriptor,view))
5: buer ← merge(view,{myDescr})
6: buer ← rank(p,buer)
7: send rst m entries of buer to p
8: receive buerp from p
9: view ← merge(buerp,view)
10: end loop
(b) Passive Thread
1: loop
2: receive buerq from q
3: buer ← merge(view,{myDescriptor})
4: buer ← rank(q,buer)
5: send rst m entries of buer to q
6: view ← merge(buerq ,view)
7: end loop
About the possible leaks, the rank function itself is revealing, but as long
as it is chosen in a way that we don't care what it reveals, there should be
no problems. To be honest, I can't think of a function that would be of any
use in our case8 and that also reveals something we would want to avoid
revealing.
7Not to be confused with the partial view of the PSS. The concept is very similar but
they are not the same `object'.
8A ranking based on latency could have revealed something about the locations of the
nodes, but the anonymizing network's onion/garlic routing attens out latency.
30 2. Architecture of a P2P anonymous cloud system
AGG
In Algorithm 3 we can see the basic aggregation algorithm that allows
each node to get to know some global property by just continuously updating
their local values based on other nodes values. Again we have an active and
a passive thread, the active one gets a neighbor from the PSS and send it its
value. The passive thread gets it and sends back its value. Finally they both
update their local values. How exactly they compute the updated value de-
pends on the type of aggregation they are trying to achieve. For the detailed
explanation about gossip-based aggregation see [8]. The aggregated value
itself tells something about the system but it's supposed to be something we
want the nodes to know or we would not be calculating it. I can't see any
problem here.
Algorithm 3 The Gossip-Based Aggregation Algorithm [8].
(a) Active Thread
1: loop
2: wait(T time units)
3: q ← getNeighbor()
4: send sp to q
5: sq ← receive(q)
6: sp ← update(sp,sq)
7: end loop
(b) Passive Thread
1: loop
2: sq ← receive(*)
3: send sp to sender(sq)
4: sp ← update(sp,sq)
5: end loop
SS
The Slicing Service, not yet implemented in the prototype but worth men-
tioning because of its possible leaks. Given a set of nodes, we might want to
group them into slices with certain characteristics e.g. network bandwidth,
processing power, storage capacity... To do so in a decentralized way we need
every node to be able to place itself in the correct slice, but this implies that
the nodes must be able to tell how good they are at something (e.g. pro-
cessing power) compared to the others. A solution has been proposed [23]:
it relies on an algorithm that's quite similar to the one used by the PSS,
with the dierence that every peer descriptor contains also a pair of values
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[attribute; random-number ] where attribute is the value of the characteris-
tic we are considering, while random-number is a uniform random number
generated over a xed interval. The goal for the nodes, is to exchange the
random numbers in a way that the position of the numbers in the xed in-
terval reects the position of the nodes holding them in a hypothetical list of
nodes sorted by the value of the attribute. As an example, let's say we are
trying to slice the nodes based on their processing power. If a node ends up
with number 1 in the interval [1;9], it means that it is very bad at processing
and it belongs to the slice of the lowest processing power nodes. Slices them-
selves have to be dened, they might be something like: poor [1;3], average
[4;6], good [7;9]. This is great but how are the numbers exchanged? We
can see that in Algorithm 4, at line 8. The active thread has just obtained
some new fresh peers the same way the PSS would have done, and now it
searches them to nd one, such that exchanging its random number with
it would improve the `sorting'. There is an improvement if the inequality
(attributeremote − attributelocal)(randomremote − randomlocal) < 0 is satised.
Algorithm 4 The Newscast Sorting Protocol [23].
(a) Active Thread
1: loop
2: wait(T time units)
3: p ← random peer from view
4: buer ← view ∪ {myAddress,ts,xq ,rq}
5: send buer to p
6: receive buerp from p
7: view ← youngest c entries of buerp ∪ view
8: i← peer from view such that (xi-xq)(ri-rq)<0
9: send (xq ,rq) to i
10: rq ← ri from i
11: end loop
(b) Passive Thread
1: loop
2: receive buerq from q
3: buer ← view ∪ {myAddress,ts,xp,rp}
4: send buer to q
5: view ← youngest c entries of buerq ∪ view
6: end loop
ts = time stamp
x = attribute value
r = random value
A possible leak here is that every node gets to know the values of the
attribute of other nodes. Such values cannot be correlated to the nodes' real
identities most of the times, but in case of few exceptional node that are a
lot better (or worse) than the other, it might be possible. Let's say that the
cloud is made of 1000 nodes, but only 10 have over 100GBps bandwidth.
An attacker that knows the 1000 real machines but does not know the as-
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sociation between fake and real identities, could use the attribute values to
make a guess. The more the attribute's value is uncommon, the less real
machines candidates remain, thus the easier the guessing will be. Of course,
the assumption that the attacker knows most of the cloud's real machines is
unrealistic. The two proposed anonymizing networks can't hide the fact that
someone is using them, but it should not be possible to know that they are
being used to anonymize this cloud system9.
Other security threats
Those are all the leaks I was able to nd, I can't really be sure that there
aren't any other. Unfortunately, there's not a particular way to nd them
other than thinking of how you would attack your own system. Obviously,
assuming that the `leak-resistance' of the basic system is good, it will be up
to the designer of any future modules to ensure their safeness.
I would also like to point out that I've only talked about the security
threats that could have resulted in the de-anonymization of the nodes. There
are a lot of other security problems that should be resolved before this system
could really be used. I'll just spend few words about the most important
one. Without any kind of authentication, anyone can inject in the cloud an
arbitrary number of modied nodes to do all kind of bad things e.g. poisoning
the PSSs with false data, `sponsoring' some nodes while totally cutting down
the communications with others and much much more.
2.3 The nal P2P anonymous cloud system ar-
chitecture
After all that's been told, Figure 2.4 should not be a surprise. The previ-
ous architecture was already almost ready to be anonymized, and just needed
9Unless some heavy trac analysis is done and some classic pattern of the cloud system
(like e.g. using the timing of the gossip algorithms) is found.
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the addition of the anonymizing component. The leaks I've found are not
serious enough to justify any major changes, but they should be kept in mind
when developing future modules.
Figure 2.4: The Anonymous P2P Cloud System Architecture.

Chapter 3
Implementation
We will now see how the proposed changes have been implemented. This
chapter is divided in two main parts. The rst one shows the changes in
the Java code of the prototype, the second one regards the creation of the
fake identity (Hidden Service) using the tools provided by the anonymizing
network (Tor).
To make it easier to compare the performances of the anonymous system
with those of the non-anonymous version, I've implemented it in a way that
allows switching the `anonymity mode' ag on or o. When the ag is set
to o, the system behaves like it did before the changes. It's not possible
at the moment to have some node that are anonymous and some that are
not, but it would not make much sense. Every nodes would still need to
run Tor even if they are not anonymous to be able to talk with anonymous
nodes. Anonymous node would still need to use Tor also for connections with
non-anonymous node or they could be easily de-anonymized. The only direct
connection in such an hybrid system would be between two non-anonymous
nodes. Performance-wise, this could make some sense, but the rest of the
system would still need to be re-designed to allow users to choose if they
want to use all the cloud or only the anonymous part. I'm not going to carry
on with this idea in this work.
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3.1 JRMI and SOCKS proxy
The prototype uses Java Remote Method Invocation (JRMI) to carry out
communications. Using JRMI it is possible to bind Java objects to `keys' in a
way that anyone requiring the objects could get them just by connecting and
providing the right key. This sounds easy but there are quite a few problems
in getting it to work with rewalls, NATs and hidden services, and I'm now
going to explain you why. The complete process of binding and retrieving an
object using JRMI is as follows:
1. The RMI Registry must be created specifying the port at which it will
listen.
2. Anyone (Java program) wanting to sign up an object to the RMI Reg-
istry must export it, connect to the Registry (be it remote or local)
and bind the exported object to a key. The object must be serializ-
able. Once an object is exported, it is associated an RMI Server that
will listen at a port automatically chosen by the JRMI system. RMI
Registry and RMI Servers can be (and often are) on the same machine
but could also be on dierent machines.
3. Anyone (Java program) wanting to retrieve the object, must connect to
the RMI Registry and provide the key. Then the RMI Registry points
the client to the RMI Server hosting the required object. The client
can then connect to it and interact with said object.
The biggest problem here is the creation of the RMI Servers at random
ports. In any realistic scenario there will surely be rewalls and NATs that
will need to be congured to allow incoming connections to certain ports. But
you can't open ports you do not know. Luckily there is a way to manually
assign ports to RMI Servers by giving a pair of socket factories to the object
during the exportation phase. One socket factory will be used to create the
RMI Server, while the second one will be passed down by the RMI Registry
to the client that will use it to connect to the RMI Server. This way it
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will work, but what if we have to bind more than one object? What if it's
not possible to know how many objects we will be needing at any certain
given time? That's exactly the case of the prototype I'm modifying. What
I've ended up doing has been deciding a pool of ten known ports. Every
time a new object needs to be exported, a small algorithm looks for a free
port among those of the well known pool. If there are no ports available,
an exception is thrown. The pool has been sized to make it unlikely that a
single node will need to host more than that many objects (ten) at the same
time.
Another minor problem with JRMI is that when you export an object
you must do so having in mind who will need it, or more precisely, where
will the users be. If the intended user is remote, then the object must be
exported with a socket able to connect to the server from remote. If you need
an object to be accessible from both local and remote then you have very few
options: you can duplicate the object and bind the former congured with a
`remote-able' socket and the latter with a `local-able' socket, or you can use
just a remote one and hope the underling system will be smart enough to
connect locally even if the socket tells otherwise. Things get worse with Tor
and the need of sockets that must talk with the local SOCKS proxy. In this
case, in no way the system will be able to see that the RMI Server is local,
and the connection will be forced to pass through Tor anyway.
A small note about performances. As we've seen, for a node to interact
with a remote object, two connections are needed, the rst to the RMI Reg-
istry, the second to the RMI Server. This will surely impact performances,
especially in anonymous mode, because the increase in latency will be paid
twice. There's really few I can do about it, the system should be re-designed
not to use JRMI, but the time at my disposal does not allow me to do it.
Back to how the prototype works, every machine hosting a node has to
run an RMI Registry. In case of multiple nodes on the same machine (but
that's not going to happen) they will all use the same RMI Registry. Com-
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munications start by connecting to the remote1 RMI Registry, then a well
known key is provided and the reference to the remote node's Communica-
tion Server is obtained. The sender can now put its message in the remote
Communication Server (think of it like a mailbox) by connecting to the RMI
Server hosting it. When a new message arrives, the Message Dispatcher
awakes and dispatches it to the appropriated module.
In practice, what we have to do to anonymize the system is change the
way the connections to the remote RMI Registry and RMI Servers are done,
to make them pass through Tor. Connections to the RMI Registry are done
using the java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry [24] class. Connections to the RMI
Servers are implicit and occur whenever interacting with the remote object.
Here's an example:
// Connecting to the remote registry
Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry(hostname, port);
// Retrieving a reference to the remote object (Communication Server)
CommSrvRemoteAPI remoteCommServer = (CommSrvRemoteAPI) registry.lookup(key);
// Delivering the message (Implicit connection to the RMI Server)
remoteCommServer.receiveMessage(msg);
Code 3.1 Connecting to a registry, getting and using a remote object. hostname is the
real identity of the remote machine, port is the number of the port at which the RMI
Registry is listening, key is a string that identify the Communication Server, msg is the
message to be delivered.
The way Tor uses to interface with applications is a SOCKS2 proxy. We
will see how to congure it at Section 3.3 when we'll talk about the Hidden
Services. Here the Java code modied to use the proxy:
1Most of the times it's remote, but it could also be local if there are multiple nodes on
the same machine.
2Socket Secure (SOCKS), it's a (de facto) standard for circuit-level gateways [25].
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/**
* Returns the registry hosted locally.
*/
public static Registry getLocalRegistry() throws RemoteException {
return LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", RMI_REGISTRY_PORT, null);
}
/**
* Returns the registry hosted at hostName.
*/
public static Registry getRemoteRegistry(String hostName) throws RemoteException {
// This two vars will be set depending on the state of ANONYMITY_ON
RMIClientSocketFactory socketFactory = null;
int port = 0;
if (!ANONYMITY_ON) {
// Direct
socketFactory = null;
port = RMI_REGISTRY_PORT;
}
else {
// Anonymous, a factory that will provide sockets that will use the given proxy
socketFactory = new RMIClientSocketFactory() {
@Override
public Socket createSocket(String host, int port) throws IOException {
// Local proxy data
SocketAddress proxyAddr = new InetSocketAddress("localhost", TOR_PORT);
Proxy proxy = new Proxy(Proxy.Type.SOCKS, proxyAddr);
Socket socket = new Socket(proxy);
socket.connect(new InetSocketAddress(host, port));
return socket;
}
};
port = RMI_REGISTRY_HIDDEN_PORT;
}
// Having socketFactory == null behaves like not having it at all
return LocateRegistry.getRegistry(hostName, port, socketFactory);
}
Code 3.2 Connecting to a RMI Registry, be it local, direct remote, or behind
a hidden service. hostName can be an IP/domain name or an onion address,
RMI_REGISTRY_PORT is the number of the port at which the real RMI Registry
is listening, RMI_REGISTRY_HIDDEN_PORT is the number of the port of the hidden
service linked to the real RMI Registry, TOR_PORT is the number of the port of the
local Tor SOCKS proxy.
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/**
* Returns a socket connected using the appropriate settings.
*/
public Socket createSocket(String host, int port) throws IOException
{
Socket socket;
if (!ANONIMITY_ON) {
// Direct
socket = new Socket();
socket.connect(new InetSocketAddress(host, port));
}
else {
// Anonymous
SocketAddress proxyAddr = new InetSocketAddress("localhost", TOR_PORT);
Proxy proxy = new Proxy(Proxy.Type.SOCKS, proxyAddr);
socket = new Socket(proxy);
socket.connect(new InetSocketAddress(host, hPort));
}
return socket;
}
Code 3.3 A piece of code from the client socket factory used to export objects. Depending
on the anonymity mode in use, host could be an IP/domain name or an onion address,
port is the number of the port at which the real RMI Server is running, hPort is the port
of the remote Tor Hidden Service , TOR_PORT is the number of the port of the local
Tor SOCKS proxy.
Another modication I've done regards the API scripts and their param-
eters. The original prototype used the Java networking APIs to get the IP
address of the local node, this address was included in the requests done by
the node and allowed the receiving nodes to know whom to reply to. Obvi-
ously this can't be done anymore, the fake identity must be provided instead
of the IP address, but there's no Java API to get it. Using Tor, such fake
address can be found in a le (we'll see it better at Section 3.3), in I2P it's
on a local conguration web page. In both cases it's not easy to get it in an
automatic way, especially considering that there could be many anonymous
node on the same host, thus many fake identities. Since this is just an imple-
mentation problem and it does not add much value to my work, I've opted
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for the easier solution, that is, the fake identity must be provided as an input
parameter in all the scripts.
// Old version
$./startNode.sh −n <node_name>
// New version
$./startNode.sh −n <node_name> −hostname <address>
Code 3.4 Example of the new hostname parameter. The address could be the real address
or the fake address, depending on the anonymity mode in use (on/o).
3.2 Other secondary but necessary changes to
the code
What I've shown in Section 3.1 are just the most meaningful changes.
There were lots of other minor modications spread all around the prototype
that needed to be done in order for it to work. The most important one
regards the fact that the prototype used only IP addresses. If there were
any hostnames in the initial partial views of the nodes, they were resolved
as soon as possible and only the resulting IP were saved. That's impossible
with onion addresses. An onion address is at some point resolved to an IP
but that link is valid only for a short amount of time. Also, the `resolution'
of the onion address has to be done by Tor, not by a standard Domain Name
System (DNS) query3.
Fixing this has not been `hard', but it took quite a bit of time because
even if the high-level architecture was well documented, the code documen-
tation relied only on Javadoc4 comments. Don't get me wrong, Javadoc is
great, but it does not help a lot if you are interested in something like: nd-
3DNS queries of onion addresses is one of the most frequent and easiest way to get
de-anonymized. They are not encrypted so a attacker can see what onion addresses a user
is connecting to.
4The (de facto) standard for documenting Java classes by formatting comments follow-
ing a certain set of rules.
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ing all the places where an IP is stored, understanding how such IPs are
set and how they are used. In addition, the project makes large use of the
practice of marshalling5 and sending runnable6 objects so that they are ex-
ecuted somewhere else. This opens up new design possibilities but it also
lowers the code comprehensibility, requiring you to rst understand where
and under what circumstances it will be executed. What I ended up doing
has been searching the code around the parts where I knew a connection was
likely to be necessary, also I've searched the whole project for keywords like
hostname, address, Inet4Address7. Once I've found and understood all
those parts I decided that the best solution would have been to keep strings
with hostnames (domain names or onion addresses) instead of IPs, moving
the resolution process to right before they are needed. Applying this also
took quite a bit of time because every changed part brought the necessity to
do other minor modications on the parts that depended on them and so on,
I'm sure you know what I'm talking about.
To sum it up, I've changed every part of the system that used an IP to
use an hostname instead. Address resolution (be it a standard domain name
or an onion address) is done on the y when needed. This will probably
adversely aect performances but as far as I know there's no way to avoid
it. Note that it's still possible to use IP addresses to identify nodes in the
non-anonymous mode just by inserting them as strings, Java is smart enough
to recognize an IP in string form, assuming it's well formed.
3.3 Setting up the hidden services
Assuming Tor is correctly installed and working on the hosting machine,
to create an hidden service we'll do the following. Locate the torrc Tor
conguration le. Its location depends on the operative system we are using
5The process of transforming the memory representation of an object to a data format
suitable for storage or transmission [27].
6Objects that are intended to be executed by a thread.
7The Java type for IPv4 addresses.
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and on how we installed Tor. This topic is covered extensively in Tor's
documentation [26] so I will not explain it here. Once located, edit it and
add the lines:
HiddenServiceDir /path/to/a/directory
HiddenServicePort fake_port real_address:real_port
Code 3.5 An example of part of a torrc le. HiddenServiceDir is the directory where
important les of the hidden services are stored. HiddenServicePort denes a mapping
between the real service and the hidden service.
For it to work, it's not important what HiddenServiceDir is chosen as long
as the Tor process can read/write in it. But since that directory contains
very important les that must remain secret, attention must be paid to who
can access it. When Tor is rst started after editing the torrc le, a key
pair is created for each hidden service and the private key is stored in the
le private_key in the HiddenServiceDir. That key must remain secret or
someone else could impersonate the hidden service. A le called hostname
containing a short summary of the public key is also generated, the content
of that le is the fake identity, the address others will use to connect to the
hidden service. This one can (should) be given out.
duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion
Code 3.6 An example of hostname le.
About the HiddenServicePort, the fake_port is the one used together
with the fake address to connect to the hidden service. Let's say our fake
port is 81, the connection to the hidden registry would be:
LocateRegistry.getRegistry("duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion", 81, socketFact);
Code 3.7 Connecting to a hidden registry.
Tor takes care to `redirect' the connection to the real service, that in our
case is hosted locally, let's say at port 8181. A torrc le congured this way
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would look like:
HiddenServicePort 81 127.0.0.1:8181
Code 3.8 Another example of torrc le.
Chapter 4
Performance evaluation
In this chapter, we will see how the modied prototype has been tested.
Tests are aimed at showing how much dierence (if any) there is between the
performances of the standard version and those of the anonymous version.
To run the tests we will need a lot of machines on which to run our prototype,
and the easiest way to get and orchestrate them is to make use of a cloud
service. Do not get confused about it, the fact that we will use a cloud service
has nothing to do with our cloud system, we need it just for the tests. It
would have been the same1 if we could have had access to many personal
computers around the world instead of using a cloud service.
4.1 Amazon EC2
As you could have guessed by the title of this section, we will use Amazon
EC2[28]. The reason is that it's one of the most used, thus it's easy to
nd documentations, examples and frameworks for many languages. Google
Cloud[29] or OpenStack[2] based solutions would have worked too. The basic
idea is that I will ask Amazon to give me a certain number of machines
1The possibility of running many instances of the exact same machine (including rewall
settings) makes it actually a lot easier for the system to work, than just using random
computers. But that's just a matter of compatibility and congurations, apart from that
there would be no dierences.
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(virtual machines) which I will control through Secure Shell2 (SSH). I will
also write a script that will orchestrate those machines to do the tests by
starting, stopping and calling the prototype's APIs. Quite simple isn't it?
Yes the concept is simple, but realizing it is not. Keep in mind that EC2
services are not free, every resource has a cost that depends on the type,
power, location, and of course on the amount of time you will use it. A
`trial and error' brute-force approach would have been quite costly so I had
to spend some time exploring all possible solutions, in order to minimize the
cost of each resource.
So, what resources are we talking about? The minimum number of re-
sources that every machine has to have to be useful for our tests is four, and
they are:
Instances. An instance is a virtual machine, with a certain computational
power and memory. Amazon EC2 lets you choose among several `tiers'
of instances[31], each one with a dierent combination of CPU and
RAM. You cannot build an instance with an arbitrary CPU and RAM,
you are bound to choose a tier. Since our prototype needs very few
resources we will go for the lowest tier possible, which at the moment
of writing is the t2.micro3. Obviously, an instance also needs a volume
(virtual disk) from which to load the operative system. Every tier
has support for some types of volume, but the volumes themselves are
stand-alone resources and we will talk about them later. An instance
can go through several states[32], the most important ones are: Stopped,
Running, Terminated. A stopped instance does not cost anything, it's
just a mere bunch of settings, it does not consume any real resources.
Once completely started, the instance will be in the running state and
2It's a network protocol that allows the creation of a secure channel between a client
and a server[30]. One of its most common uses is remote command execution, and that's
exactly what I will use it for.
3The t2.micro tier comes with a single virtual CPU 2.5GHz, 1GB of RAM, support
only EBS volumes, has `Low to Moderate' network performances and can only be used
with HVM AMIs[31].
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you will start to pay for it. Costs are counted on an hourly basis,
which means that you will be charged for every hour the instance will
be running. It's also important to know that you will pay for a full hour
even if you use it for just a minute, one hour is the minimum unit of
time. The `hours counter' will start every time the instance is started
so if you stop and start it many times within an hour you will pay a
full hour for every time the instance was started. This has inuenced
the design of the tests a lot. The nal state, terminated, is reached
when the user choose to permanently destroy the instance.
Volumes. Volumes are virtual storage devices. They can be divided in two
main categories: the ephemeral ones (Instance Store[33]) and the per-
sistent ones (Elastic Block Storage[34]). All data inside Instance Store
(IS) volumes are permanently lost when the related instance is stopped
or terminated, while Elastic Block Storage (EBS) volumes can live on
without being attached to a running instance. The main cost factor
of volumes is how big they are, you pay for the number of Gigabyte
reserved to you. Note that if you have a 100GB disk with just 1GB
used, you will still pay for all the 100GB so choosing the right size is
important. The t2.micro instances tier that I will use supports only
EBS root volumes so I don't really have a choice here.
AMI. AMI stands for Amazon Machine Image[35], it's the standard used by
Amazon for boot-able disk images. Inside an AMI there's an operative
system and any possible software that the creator of the AMI decided
to put in it. AMIs and Volumes are strictly related, every AMI is bound
to a specic type of volume. EBS-backed AMIs will run only on EBS
volumes, while IS-backed ones will need IS volumes. When an instance
is started using an AMI, an appropriated volume will be created. Note
that who creates the AMI also decide the size of the disk, and you'll
be forced to have a disk of at least that size. Creating an AMI from
scratch is possible but quite complicated, the best way to go is often to
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start from an existing AMI and modify it to your needs. Once you're
done with the modications you can use an Amazon tool to make a
new AMI from what you ended up with. Another important thing
to know is that Amazon EC2 supports two types of virtualization[36]:
Paravirtualization[37] (PV) and Hardware-assisted virtualization, also
called Hardware virtual machine[38] (HVM). Each tier of instances may
support one or both of them, while AMIs are made to support only
one of them. To make it all work you must choose an AMI with the
virtualization type supported by the tier you want to use. The t2.micro
tier only supports HVM instances and that caused me some troubles
because the Debian4 AMI[39] I decided to use only support PV. I solved
using an experimental version5 of the Debian AMI. Last but not least
important thing to know about AMIs is that they have a cost. Most
of it comes form the operative system they contain, but can also come
from the rest of the software and/or from the possibility to get ocial
support. Unix based AMIs are mostly free and I didn't have to use any
shareware software so I totally avoided AMI related costs.
Network. Every instance has a network interface, it's not exactly `required'
for the instance to exist, but without it, it would not be possible to
connect to it and since it's in the cloud, it would be quite useless6.
My instances will have a public and a private network interface. The
private one will be used to communicate with other instances inside the
same region, the public interface is needed for me to be able to connect
to them from outside the cloud. The cost of networking is determined
by how much data ows from and into each network interface. A com-
munication between two instances of the same region can be carried out
using the private interface, and costs much less that the trac between
4It's a widespread free operative system. It uses the Linux or the FreeBSD kernel, most
of its tools come from the GNU Project[40].
5The exact AMI I started from is the one with the id: ami-698cdf59 [41].
6Instances used for working on big amounts of data, that do not need any input/output,
might make sense even without network interface.
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an instance and something on the internet, that must use the public
interface.
Prices for all the resources I've listed are ever changing and can be found
on the Amazon Web Services (AWS) site[42]. Another thing to know is that
users cannot ask for an arbitrary amount of resources. Every account has
default limits[43] that may be lifted by posting an `increase limit request'
to Amazon's support. Those limits are there because, with all the `digital
power' that comes with the relatively cheap cloud resource, an inexperienced
or malicious user could digitally harm someone. Also, it's not that hard to
make mistakes when trying to automate things (like instances creation) and
that may lead to unexpectedly high bills. I lled a limit increase request,
asking for the possibility to start 1000 t2.micro instances but due to the
`youth' of my account they could only lift my limits up to 50, thus tests will
be done with 50 machines.
4.2 Setting up the tests on EC2
50 machines might not be that much but it's still too much to be handled
manually. We need to automate things to be able to put out some meaningful
tests. Let's see what we need to do with some pseudo-code:
Algorithm 5 Tester script pseudo-code
1: create instances
2: loop
3: parameters ← readParametersFile()
4: if parameters is null then
5: break
6: end if
7: start/restart remote prototypes with parameters
8: start/restart local prototype with parameters
9: start the monitor-instances API and wait for the network to initialize
10: start the rst run-nodes API
11: start the second run-nodes API
12: end loop
13: terminate instances
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We are interested in testing how much time it will take for the network
to initialize (line 9), how much time a request for the creation of a sub-cloud
will take to complete (line 10), and how much time it will take for a second
sub-cloud to form (line 11), when almost half the nodes are already used by
the rst sub-cloud. All the tests will be done on both the standard and the
anonymous version, we will also see how things change when varying the size
of the local view of the nodes. Parameters, which are: anonymity mode and
view size, will be read from a le (line 3).
Something that has not yet been written is how the system will bootstrap.
We know that all the nodes are kept together by the overlay formed by the
Peer Sampling Service, making use of the information of the local views.
The problem is that we don't know the addresses of the nodes (be them
IP or .onion) up until run-time, so we can't ll the views with meaningful
information. The adopted solution consists of using a special node with a
well know IP and .onion address, that will be put in all the views of the other
nodes. It will serve as a linking point for the network and even though it will
be very `busy' soon after it is created, its central position will fade over time
as nodes will start to know each others. This will also be useful for our tests,
because the special node will naturally function as a barrier for the whole
network. We can start all the other nodes whenever we want, knowing that
they will stay isolated until the central node is started. The best place for
this central node to be, is the same machine where the tester will be running.
The tester will start the local well known node after all the other nodes will
be ready, and will start counting the time from that moment. The network
will be considered initialized when the API monitor-instances will report an
estimated number of nodes in the network, close enough to the real number7.
Back to the pseudo-code, we can think of it as the union of three dif-
ferent parts: managing the instances, managing the execution of the remote
7The reason why we don't wait for the exact real number of nodes, is that the estimation
process is not perfect. With a non-trivial number of nodes it will probably never stabilize
on the exact value. Not to mention that nodes may crash, and even if we could estimate
it perfectly, just one dead node would cause us to wait forever.
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commands on them, and managing the local prototype and the API calls on
it. The last one is quite easy with some bash scripting, but the other two
might prove more challenging. Still they are quite common needs so there
exist a lot of frameworks to ease our work. After some studies I've decided
to use Python language for my tester, since two of the best and most used
frameworks to do the things I just wrote up here are for Python, and it's full
of useful examples on the Internet.
4.2.1 Boto
Boto[44] is a powerful Python framework for interacting with Amazon's
EC2 APIs. I will use it for the creation/termination of the instances and for
retrieving information about them, such as their status and their hostname.
The hostname will be used for executing remote commands as we will see
later at 4.2.2. Here an example of instances creation with boto:
conn = boto.ec2.connect_to_region("us-west-2", prole_name="michele.amati")
res = conn.run_instances(image_id="ami-15240025",
min_count=49,
max_count=49,
key_name=KEY_PAIR_NAME,
security_groups=[SECURITY_GROUP_NAME],
instance_type="t2.micro",
monitoring_enabled=False,
disable_api_termination=False,
instance_initiated_shutdown_behavior="terminate",
client_token=ONE_TIME_TOKEN,
dry_run=False)
Code 4.1 An example of instances creation. First we get a connection to the Amazon's
region in which we want to start the instances, then we specify how do we want them.
Important parameters are: the id of the AMI, the number of instances we want, the
cryptographic key pair that we will use to access them, the security group (rewall
settings), the type of instances, and what should they do when they are shutdown.
For Boto to work, it must be congured with the credentials of the user's
AWS account. They are not those used to log into Amazon's services, but
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special ones created expressly for EC2 using the AWS web console. They
must be placed in the le:
> cat /home/user/.aws/credentials
[michele.amati]
aws_access_key_id = XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
aws_secret_access_key = XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Code 4.2 The credentials conguration le.
If the call at Code 4.1 succeeds, we obtain what they call a `reservation',
which is like a set of instances. Obviously the call might also fails, for con-
guration errors, something wrong at Amazon's side or simply because the
resources we are asking for are not available, exceptions must be handled.
Also remember that even if Boto is great, you still need to know what you're
doing, because nothing prevents you from forming invalid requests, like trying
to ask for an instance with an impossible conguration.
4.2.2 Fabric
The Fabric[45] Python framework will help us executing the remote com-
mands needed to start/restart the prototypes on all the instances. Another
option would have been to terminate and re-create them every time (with
the prototype starting automatically at boot) but considering the way costs
are calculated it is much better to keep the instances up and just restart the
prototypes. The main advantage of using Fabric instead of other lower level
SSH libraries like Paramiko[46], is that Fabric allows you to do the following:
give it a task (command to be executed) and a list of hosts, it will automat-
ically execute the task on all host, with the desired degree of parallelism.
Errors must be handles somehow, because with remote calls there are lots
of things that might go wrong, but still the overall management of remote
executions is much simplied.
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@parallel(pool_size=5)
def reset_prototype_task(commands):
tmp = ""
for cmd in commands:
tmp = tmp + "{}{}".format(cmd, ";")
return run(tmp)
results = execute(reset_prototype_task, commands, hosts=hostnames)
Code 4.3 Example of remote command execution with Fabric. The list of hostname is
obtained using Boto, the commands are just strings chained with the `;' character that
will cause them to be executed in order, always waiting for the previous one to terminate.
The @parallel annotation tells Fabric that it can execute a maximum of 5 commands in
parallel.
To be able to connect to the various hosts Fabric must be given the
appropriated credentials, that might be a user and a password or a private key
le. Amazon forces you to use the latter for SSH connections, remember the
KEY_PAIR_NAME parameter that we set during the instances creation?
That's what it is used for. Here at Code 4.4 are some other settings that
might be worth looking at, especially when working with many hosts.
# Automatically accept hosts fingerprint
env.reject_unknown_hosts = False
# Ignore hosts to which connections are impossible
env.skip_bad_hosts = True
# Try connecting X time before giving up
env.connection_attempts = 3
# Do not abort execution if something on some host fails
env.warn_only = True
# The user to use
env.user = "admin"
# The path to the private key file
env.key_lename = ["/path/to/the/privatekey.pem"]
Code 4.4 Useful Fabric settings when dealing with multiple hosts.
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4.3 Tests results
Tests have been run with the following sets of parameters:
{
anonymity_mode: o
view_size: 20%
},
{
anonymity_mode: o
view_size: 50%
},
{
anonymity_mode: o
view_size: 90%
},
{
anonymity_mode: tor
view_size: 20%
},
{
anonymity_mode: tor
view_size: 50%
},
{
anonymity_mode: tor
view_size: 90%
}
Code 4.5 The anonymity mode `o' means the standard version, while `tor' is the
anonymous version. The size of the view is expressed as a percentage of the total number
of nodes. Each one of the six tests has been executed ten times.
The initial idea was to consider the network initialized when the estimated
number of nodes reaches a value as close as possible to the real number of
nodes. But during the rst tests with a number of nodes (50) larger than
the one used for developing/debugging (5), I realized that such estimated
value was quite unstable. I ended up accepting as `good' any value in the
range [RNN − RNN ∗ 0.3;RNN + RNN ∗ 0.3], where RNN is the real
number of nodes. That's a pretty `generous' range, but still sometimes it's not
large enough and the prototype fails to stabilize. So, I consider the network
4.3 Tests results 55
initialized if the monitoring API gives me ve consecutive values in that
range. I must admit that I came out with that `ve' with no theory proven
reason, I just saw that less than ve causes the prototype to be considered
stabilized too soon most of the times, while more than ve has a great chance
to lead to a never ending stabilization process. This stabilization problem has
quite bad consequences for all the tests. It makes them considerably longer
(thus more expensive) but can also false the results, because subsequent calls
(run-nodes) might fail if they are done on a not yet completely initialized
network.
About the run-nodes API, I've made the calls ask for forming sub-clouds
of size determined by: MIN(RNN ∗ 0.45, V S), where V S is the size of the
views. The reason why each call cannot get more than 45% of the network
is that nodes might crash or become unreachable, so leaving out 10% of the
nodes makes the tests more likely to complete. Also, limiting them to the
size of the views makes the rst call able to complete without having to wait
for the Peer Sampling Service to change the view, allowing us to make some
potentially interesting considerations in the performances comparison phase.
In the following pages I've reported the results. Please note that tests
can fail to yield a result, leaving us with missing values. This can cause
calculations like: average and standard deviation, to be done on sets of values
of dierent sizes.
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Parameters Completed AVG(s) DEV(s) MIN(s) MAX(s)
o, 20% 10/10 141.13 55.37 85.07 225.19
tor, 20% 3/10 330.29 70.06 280.26 415.37
o, 50% 10/10 104.58 48.66 50.04 220.18
tor, 50% 2/10 377.83 17.67 365.33 390.32
o, 90% 10/10 179.16 98.26 65.05 335.28
tor, 90% 1/10 175.15 − 175.15 175.15
Table 4.1: The time taken for the network to initialize
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Figure 4.1: Average network initialization times compared
As we can see, the anonymous version takes more than twice the time
used by the standard version. About the results with the 90% view size,
they are very close, but consider that only 1 out of 10 anonymous version
tests completed successfully, and that might have been a very lucky case.
The timeout is set at 500 seconds so if we considered the failed tests as tests
that would have required more than 500 seconds to complete, we will get a
much higher average, in line with the results of the tests taken with the other
two view sizes.
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Parameters Completed AVG(s) DEV(s) MIN(s) MAX(s)
o, 20% 10/10 1.80 0.42 1.00 2.01
tor, 20% 9/10 227.57 28.29 198.21 284.31
o, 50% 10/10 2.00 0.01 2.00 2.01
tor, 50% 9/10 536.12 48.36 496.53 641.67
o, 90% 10/10 10.51 14.97 2.00 49.05
tor, 90% 9/10 563.26 35.27 526.56 620.66
Table 4.2: The time taken for the rst run-nodes to complete
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Figure 4.2: Average time to complete the rst run-nodes call compared
The dierence between the two versions is even higher in the rst run-
nodes tests. The prototype looks for a new node to add to the sub-cloud
only when the previous node has replied (positively or negatively), so, even
assuming that all the contacted nodes will be able to join, the last node will
be contacted only after `paying' two time the latency for each previous node.
Remember also that we are using JRMI that alone doubles the number of
connections required to carry out a single communication, resulting in the
latency been paid four times for each node. The standard prototype uses
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the EC2 internal network with an average latency of 1ms, so every node will
`cost' less than 5ms. The anonymous version's latency really depends on the
Tor network status, and might go from 300ms to 1500ms. If we consider an
average of 900ms, than every node would required 3600ms to join. This alone
cannot explain the huge amount of time taken by the anonymous version.
The only other thing I can think of is that the high amount of failures in
determining if the network was initialized or not (in the anonymous version),
might have lead to the start of the run-nodes without the network being
totally initialized. Thus the assumption that the rst run-nodes would have
had all the information required ready in the view would be true only for the
standard version.
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Parameters Completed AVG(s) DEV(s) MIN(s) MAX(s)
o, 20% 10/10 3.30 1.16 2.00 5.01
tor, 20% 10/10 247.16 24.01 210.20 292.31
o, 50% 8/10 12.26 9.70 5.00 34.04
tor, 50% 7/10 929.54 156.33 757.74 1179.25
o, 90% 10/10 70.77 77.90 3.00 168.18
tor, 90% 8/10 822.58 70.78 708.69 894.86
Table 4.3: The time taken for the second run-nodes to complete
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Figure 4.3: Average time to complete the second run-nodes call compared
The second run-nodes behaves almost like the rst one, just with bigger
numbers for both versions, which is easily explained by the fact that the
number of `free' nodes is less. An interesting thing to notice is that the
20% view size anonymous version test doesn't dier that much from the
same test of the rst run-nodes. This might be another sign that most
of the anonymous tests started doing the run-nodes without been properly
initialized, because having in the views nodes that are already in the rst
sub-cloud (thus cannot take part in the second) should behave almost like
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having the fake non-existing nodes used to ll the xed-size views prior to
their complete initialization.
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Figure 4.4: Initializations completed without incurring in the timeout, max is 10
The results seem to suggest that increasing the time limit for the ini-
tialization might help, but during some preliminary tests (not reported in
this document) without any kind of timeout, I've seen it failing to stabilize
most of the times, even after three time the current timeout. I've checked
the code that does the estimation and it seems to be implemented correctly,
according to [8]. I suspect that the epochs length might not be optimal for
Tor's latency.
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Figure 4.5: (rst) Run-nodes completed without incurring in the timeout, max is 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
20%
50%
90%
10
8
10
10
7
8
Time (seconds)
V
ie
w
si
ze
o
tor
Figure 4.6: (second) Run-nodes completed without incurring in the timeout, max is 10

Conclusions
We wanted to see if it were possible to create an infrastructure-level soft-
ware for the oering of anonymous cloud services, starting from an existing
prototype based on a peer-to-peer architecture. We did it, the prototype
has been successfully adapted and now it's anonymous. Performances has
been tested and they are worse that expected. There where good reasons to
think of a decrease in performances, starting from the intrinsic delay of the
anonymizing networks, followed by the use of Java Remote Method Invoca-
tion (that doubles connections), but still I wouldn't have thought them to
be that bad.
Another thing to notice is that the original prototype was (and still is)
not very failure resistant. There are many situations in which, if something
goes wrong, the whole system will hang. Due to the way it is implemented it
would be hard and quite time consuming to `x' it, and since my work is not
about the cloud system itself but just its anonymization, I could not spend
time in doing it. This instability might have been the cause of some of the
failed tests.
About the tests part, studying Amazon EC2 took a lot of time, almost
1/3 of the time I had. When I started, I knew close to nothing about it, and
even if now I can't surely be called an expert, I can say that I know what I'm
doing. I might have spent that time better, like in improving the prototype,
but knowing that there would have been costs, especially considering that
the rst idea was to test it with 1000 instances, made me wanted to be very
sure of what I was doing.
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64 CONCLUSIONS
My personal opinion is that any future development of this project should
start by revisiting the core of the prototype communications, to substitute
the Java Remote Method Invocation with something more `direct'. Soon
after that I would advise to try improving its resilience to failures or at least
design some kind of fall-back mechanism to avoid ending up in inconsistent
states.
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